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Anon-essentialist theory of race: the case of
anAfro-indigenous village in northern Peru
In the village of Yapatera, Peru, there exists a folk theory of race which posits that humans cannot be divided
into mutually exclusive racial groups and that personhood is both physiologically and socially ‘mixed’. By
engaging with the psychological literature on racial essentialism (i.e. the tendency to view humans in terms
of discrete categories, as if they were natural kinds), this article digs deeper into the local folk theory of race.
Experimental tasks were designed to test the inductive potential of race and revealed that villagers are far more
likely to use other social categories (class, religion, kinship and place of origins) than race to base their
inferences. The article discusses the use of experimental tasks as a vehicle for a different sort of conversation
between ethnographer and informants.
Key words race, cognition, Latin America, essentialism, mestizaje, kinship
I n t r o duc t i o n
What do ordinary people mean when they invoke concepts of ‘race’ or speak of ‘races’ in
everyday life?Given that race is nowwidely accepted to be a socially constructed concept,
we can expect a great variability in the culturally and historically speciﬁc meanings and
uses to which concepts such as ‘race’ are put. We also know of societies and historical pe-
riods where the concept of race has been absent. As a result, there are no simple interpre-
tations of how concepts such as race are used locally. For example, in a given society, is
race an individual or a collective property? Is it given or made?How is it linked to, or dif-
ferent from, concepts and practices in the domains of kinship, religion, class and work?
Does it sit on the surface of the human body or deep inside it? Is it visible or invisible?
My ﬁeld site, Yapatera, is a rural village on the northern Andean coast of Peru,
built around the ruins of a former plantation. Contemporary villagers are descended
from African and African-descended slaves and free people, as well as from indigenous
labourers free from the colonial obligations of mita (tribute payments). These terms,
however, including ‘African’ and ‘indigenous’, have little meaning in contemporary
Yapatera. Villagers might instead refer to their descendants as cholos, zambos and
morenos, all terms which denote individuals of mixed race, with varying mixtures of
black, indigenous and white. My informants rarely spoke of raza, Spanish for race.
When they did, the term usually came up in discussions of family history. The
following, taken from one of many conversations with my friend Plácida, on the
vereda, or paved front patio of her house, is a typical verbal context for raza:
Just like on my father’s side, on my mother’s side there are also two kinds of
families. My mother’s father was from Yapatera and her mother from Piura
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[the capital of the state in which Yapatera is located], but she came from the
Chalaco race, from the Sierra of Morropón [a nearby mountain range], over
there. My mother was born here. My cousins, her nieces and nephews, are big tall
whites [blancones]. The negrito [a little black] part of me comes from the Riega
[a surname], from my maternal grandfather. And my mother’s ﬁrst children were
very white, but they died. My father was an overseer on the cotton plantation; he
was an outsider, he immigrated to here and he married my mother. You see it’s a
hodgepodge [mezcolanza] of families, of races.
Whatmaymake Plácida’s explanation difﬁcult to follow is the at times overlapping, at
times contrasting, associations given to raza: it describes skin colour but also a very
localised geographic origin; it is linked to regional migratory processes, to occupation
and to a kin group marked by a shared surname; it contains a sense of ‘lineage’ but also
a recognition of race’s non-linear ﬂow. In a single family we ﬁnd black and white
cousins and siblings; in one person, the narrator, we ﬁnd black and white ‘parts’. Plácida’s
characterisation of the mixed quality of family and races, and the story of migration and
intermarriage, is typical of views on these subjects in Yapatera. Plácida’s explanation is
linked to a very particular local folk theory of race, one which does not use race to create
human groups and to predict their members’ properties, precisely because of the
‘hodgepodge’mixture that is thought to make persons, families and the village as a whole.
Outside of Yapatera, however, there are narratives which posit a much more
pivotal role for race. These come in two contrasting forms: one is in the pervasive
anti-black, anti-indigenous, anti-mixed race and broadly pro-white/pro-European
racism; the other is in the form of an urban-based ‘Afro-Peruvian’ ethnic and racial
consciousness movement. The local folk theory of race on the one hand and racism and
the ethnic consciousness movement on the other operate with contrasting constructions
of race. This led me to ask the following questions: how robust really are local ideas about
race and the importance of mixture, given the existence of these alternative constructions
of race? And to what extent is the local folk theory of race that is articulated in local
narratives, such as those of Plácida’s family history, not just a way of talking but also a
way of thinking? These questions prompted me to examine local ideas about race and
racial mixing in the light of cognitive and developmental psychological work on social
and racial ‘essentialism’, in the hope of arriving at a deeper understanding of local theories
and concepts of race. The aim of this article is twofold: to illuminate a puzzle which has
long held the attention of scholars working on Latin America, namely the co-existence
of national ideologies of mixture on the one hand and racism and structural inequalities
along ‘racial’ and ethnic lines and to illustrate the beneﬁts of employing experimental
methods alongside ethnographic ones to understand local ideas about ‘race’. To this end
I present the ethnographic background and the design and results of an experimental task,
and a related control task, which tested the extent to which race is used as an ‘inferential
category’ compared with other socially salient categories.
A local theory of race: mixing and the absence of racial groups
Mestizaje (in Brazil mestiçagem) is the name given to discourses of nationhood
grounded in the idea of racial mixture which emerged throughout the Americas during
struggles for independence and gained currency in the 20th century (for an overview
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see Wade 1997). Ideological narratives of mixture and national symbols of mixedness, in-
cludingmestizaje, have received scholarly attention in a wide range of disciplines includ-
ing political science, philosophy, theology, literature, ﬁne arts, performing arts, popular
culture, museum studies, Chicano studies and queer studies, among others. In recent
years, increasing attention has been devoted to showing the varying manifestations and
interpretations ofmestizaje in different national contexts.Mestizaje and related concepts,
such as ‘racial democracy’, which denote post-racial unity and class rather than race-
based stratiﬁcation, have long been seen as linked to exclusionary preferences for
blanqueamiento, or whitening (for an early discussion, see Whitten 1965, 1974). A
puzzle that has deeply concerned scholars in the region, including anthropologists, is
the tension between the existence of racism and constructions of these nations as
‘raceless’ (for Peru: de la Cadena 2000; for Ecuador: Whitten 2003; for Colombia: Wade
1993; for Venezuela: Wright 1990; for Brazil: Burdick 1998; Goldstein 2003; Sheriff
2001; Telles 2004; Twine 1998, among others). Despite these fruitful debates surrounding
the concept, however, mestizaje runs the risk of being treated as only ideological.
While it is easy to characterise mestizaje as a ﬁction employed by those at the top
of the social hierarchy to dominate those at the bottom and to justify existing social
hierarchies – no doubt mestizaje has been used this way – the weight of such arguments
has for some time eclipsed the question of how mestizaje matters as a ‘lived experience’
(Wade 2005): that is, as something shaped by ordinary people in their everyday lives.1
In Yapatera, ideas about racial mixing have an everyday signiﬁcance which cannot
be overlooked. Such ideas are shaped by Yapatera’s history as a hacienda, or plantation,
which functioned from the 16th century until the 1960s, producing, among other
produce, rice, cotton, tobacco and brieﬂy, but famously, sugar cane. Slavery, and mita,
the form of tribute payments reserved for ‘Indians’2 in exchange for protections of
communal lands, were abolished in Peru in the mid 19th century, partially as a result
of the demand for labour. A rural landless class of peasants, without ethnic associations
and privileges, was in the process of creation. While the majority of freed rural slaves
migrated to the cities, free people of African descent who chose to remain on the rural
plantations came to live, work and intermarry with indigenous labourers forming com-
munities of mixed-race tenants, ﬁeld hands and share-croppers. Nation-building
projects constructed the Peruvian coast as a non- or post-racial centre of modernity,
industry, education, culture and civilisation, while casting the rural highlands as the site
of backward Indians. As villagers in Yapatera themselves are at pains to stress, the
scarcity of labour on the hacienda created the conditions for social mixing and
intermarriage between different types of plantation workers from different parts of
the region – and, by implication, with differing ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ attributes. As part
of agrarian reforms in the 1960s, plantations were expropriated and turned over to
worker-owned cooperatives; in ideological terms these reforms sought to dismantle
any remaining social distinctions between different types of plantation workers and
reinforced the notion of belonging to one peasant (campesino) class. Villagers in
1 The Brazilian literature cited throughout has developed more on this issue than debates in the rest of
Latin America.
2 Several historians and anthropologists now agree that colonial differences between Indians, non-
Indians and slaves originated in religious deﬁnitions (de la Cadena 2005; Gose 2010; Martínez
2008; O’Toole 2012: 25–9) and were intended primarily as legal categories, denoting different
rights and obligations, rather than being based on ideas about natural or phenotypical difference
(e.g. Harris 1995; for Peru: O’Toole 2012: 164).
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Yapatera see themselves, ﬁrst and foremost, as small-scale peasant farmers with
hard-won connections to their agricultural land (cooperatives were dissolved in the
1980s), rather than identifying along any ethnic or racial lines.3
It is within this historical, social and economic context that ideas about race and the
role that it plays in social categorisation and social life have emerged. While a large
number of villagers in Yapatera today have dark skin, curly hair and other features
which can be read as related to ‘blackness’ in Peruvian racial typologies, villagers regard
historical links to Africa as hearsay and say that ‘real’ blacks (negros netos/verdaderos)
are to be found elsewhere in Peru. Today, they say, blackness has ‘blended itself away’,
‘faded out’ or ‘sparsiﬁed’. Villagers distance themselves from such racial labels, stating
that their history is one of racial mixing and intermarriage.
Ideas about mixing are grounded in a folk theory of race, which links ideas about
physiology, procreation, kinship and human kinds and bodies. For people in Yapatera,
raza ‘race’, or razas, ‘races’, are hidden substances which sit inside the human body,
especially the blood which is the force responsible for animating bodies. Races, inside
the blood, are inherited or ‘dragged down’ directly from one’s immediate ancestors and
progenitors: in the ﬁrst line from one’s two parents and in the second from one’s
maternal and paternal grandparents. One’s two parents are thought to be made of
inherently different bloods and, by extension, they are made of different races. In the
moment of conception, referred to as the cruce, ‘crossing’, of the bloods of mother
and father, the races come together in equal parts, however one may be stronger or
weaker in ultimately determining the racial composition of the offspring. Races are
responsible for inﬂuencing a host of visible characteristics on the individual’s physical
body including skin colour, hair texture, shape of the nose and mouth, body shape,
stature and so on. However, there is no predictable pattern in which they do so, such
that one can never know how a particular child of two particular parents will come
out. Villagers frequently draw attention to the diversity of appearances within sibling
groups, wider kin groups and, by extension, within the village as a whole. My host
aunt, Luz, explained to me the variation in the children of her sisters and her brothers
by saying that:
We sisters, our children don’t come out black. You look at the children of my
oldest sister: they aren’t black. They aren’t black, black, they are light brown.
The son of my second sister, he is white. The son of my third sister is also white.
All of my sisters married men who were whiter. And me with the father of my
child, he is white and my son he also isn’t black. My brothers, by contrast, the
ﬁrst married a girl who was really white, white, of Cajamarcan descent and his
child came out moreno [brown]. Another brother he has two daughters from
two different mothers: one negrita, the other, also negrita. My third brother,
his wife is very white too, but their daughter is morena. The fourth brother’s
children: morenos. In the case of my brothers, the men predominate.
The terms used to describe ‘racial’ characteristics, such as skin colour, hair texture
and so on, reﬂect a variability, ambiguity and what has been described elsewhere as
3 Many neighbouring countries in the region have embraced multicultural reforms and Peru, like
others, has seen a growing visibility of indigenous and afro-descendent ethnic social movements
and ethnic politics, especially since the 1990s. However, these movements have had little impact
in the far north of the country and Peruvian governments have been extremely slow to give state
recognition and confer rights on the basis of ethnic and cultural ‘identities’.
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‘ﬂuidity’ (for similarities in Brazil see Harris 1970; Jones 2009; Telles 2004; for
Colombia see Wade 1993; for Venezuela see Wright 1990; for Puerto Rico see Gravlee
2005). There are no standard terms of reference for ‘racial’ characteristics; words are
often invented on the spot and villagers make use of a combination of terms to describe
skin colour, hair texture and stature, as well as employing diminutives and
comparatives to differentiate individuals (such as describing someone as negrito, ‘little
black’, or moreno claro, ‘lighter brown’). Classiﬁcation is relative to one’s point of
reference and lies in the eye of the beholder, hence two speakers may describe the same
individual in very different terms. This also makes any descriptions or labels open to
contestation and negotiation. Villagers maintain that ‘true’ or ‘pure’ whites are
foreigners, and that true blacks are people from Southern Peru or Africans. Categories
such as ‘black’ and ‘white’, therefore, referring to people outside the village, operate as
what Gow has called ‘external poles’ (2007: 199), rendering, by comparison, all villagers
more or less ‘mixed’.
Race, a substance transmitted through descent, is by default both a product of, and
driver of, mixture. What are the implications of such a view for social categorisation?
While racial ascription is thought of as an individual physiological characteristic,
insofar as it derives, in a literal sense, from one’s kin relations as the combined effect
of what is carried in one’s mother’s and father’s blood, a person’s race is necessarily
multiple rather than singular. Because of this multiple quality and because everyone
is in different ways ‘mixed’, race can hardly be used to categorise people into bounded
and exclusive social groups such as ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’. Indeed, villagers rarely
generalise about ‘blacks’, ‘whites’ or ‘cholos’ (a term from the Andean region often
translated as mixed Spanish-indigenous) or speak as if such social categories existed,
nor do they employ racial terms to imply deeper characteristics shared by those
denoted by those racial terms. ‘Race’, therefore, cannot be used to predict any socially
signiﬁcant things such as customs, beliefs or behaviours. For example, in order to
explain the local marriage practice of elopement, villagers did not invoke a shared
ethnic or racial group membership, but would explain the practice using an economic
argument, with reference to their shared class position as ‘the poor’: young men in
Yapatera cannot afford to ask for a girl’s hand in marriage because this would require
a costly period of engagement, including displays of wealth and gifts for the bride and
her family – instead they resort to ‘stealing’ women. Similarly, other social markers
such as religion, place of origin and relatedness are used to talk about signiﬁcant resem-
blances and differences that exist in Yapatera. For example, villagers talk about the dif-
ference between Peruvians and Chileans, between rich and poor, between Catholics
and Evangelicals, between rural peasants and city dwellers.
According to this folk theory, race is an individual, physiological characteristic
which can vary as much between kin as it does between strangers. Therefore, to sort
people into groups according to a single physiological characteristic such as skin colour
would be as pointless as classifying people according to their height. Local ideas about
race in Yapatera, although framed by the idioms of blood and descent, differ quite
markedly from those prevalent in Europe and North America. The model of race
found in Yapatera challenges the assumption that individuals can be classed fairly un-
ambiguously according to race and undermines the common, especially North Amer-
ican, practice of assigning the offspring of racially different parents to the category of
the minority parent (Wade 1993). Ideas about race in Europe, North America and many
post-colonial settings stress the notions of purity and pedigree and the policing of racial
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boundaries. The theory in Yapatera, by contrast, places processes of mixing and the
quality of mixedness at the centre of ideas about race. In this view, race is more graded
than absolute, more continuous than discrete; it is therefore useless as a means to classify
people into discrete and mutually exclusive groups.
The emphasis on mixture has a normative component beyond what it says about
local beliefs about physiology and procreation. It is linked to the proper constitution
of personhood, to the notion of the passage of time, to a sense of place through the
physical and moral growth, establishment and consolidation of the village over time,
to the historical relations with the plantation, to labour history, and to the historical
agency of the ancestors. An emphasis on mixing derives from a bilateral understanding
of kinship in which the biological, as well as the symbolic and material contributions of
father and mother are to be recognised and given equal weight. In Yapatera, bilateral
kinship ideology presents a template for thinking about persons who are both socially
and physiologically ‘mixed’. Family histories centre on the marriage (or other union) of
an ancestral couple, and villagers, more often than not, draw attention to a racial
difference between the husband and wife. Kinship, and mixing as part of the ﬂow of
kinship’, is constitutive of a sense of history that echoes Gow’s description of ideas
about race for Piro people in Amazonian Peru:
‘Race’, in a sense, is a marker of personal identity which links a person to a
particular known ancestor in the ﬁrst or second ascending generation. ‘Race’ is
part of the person’s identity, and can be transmitted to his or her children. More
than anything, identifying a person as of a particular ‘race’ places that person
within the history of the construction of kinship. ‘Race’ is a mark that identiﬁes
a person as the child or grandchild of a particular person. But because everyone
on the Bajo Urubamba is ‘of mixed blood’, identiﬁcations of ‘race’ locate everyone
in the system of ancestral intermarriage which forms local history. (1991: 257)
To suggest to a villager in Yapatera that individuals can be classed in a straightforward
manner into exclusive racial categories is to claim that mixing has not happened and thus
to deny the very course of history, kinship and village-making.
A l t e r na t i v e cons t r u c t i o n s o f r a ce : e t hn i c ac t i v i sm and
r ac i sm
Despite this widespread, fairly explicit cultural narrative about the centrality of mixing
and the resulting irrelevance of race as a basis for categorising humans into groups,
villagers are exposed to two other discourses about race, which differ quite markedly
from their own. First, Yapatera is constructed as an ‘Afro-Peruvian’ or ‘black’ village
by ethnic entrepreneurs and activists based in Peru’s capital Lima, who seek recognition,
rights and funding from the national government and international aid organisations.
Following this lead, various cultural activists, writers, folklorists and journalists also
depict Yapatera as a cradle of authentic black Peruvian culture. This construction
contrasts with villagers’ own disavowal of the terms ‘black’ and ‘Afro-Peruvian’ and
glosses over their own emphasis on mixture. On a day-to-day basis, however, villagers
are not confronted with this image of Yapatera as an ‘Afro-Peruvian’ or ‘black village’,
since activists, based a 16-hour bus journey away in Lima, visit the village only a few
times a year and never stay for more than a few days.
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While this ﬁrst construction casts ‘blackness’ as something to be celebrated, the
second alternative understanding of race casts an entirely negative light on ‘blackness’
and on ‘Indianness’; this is racism, which is pervasively present in Peru despite a
national ideology of ‘racelessness’. People of darker skin and those of indigenous
descent in Peru are regularly discriminated against in the mainstream media and the
popular imagination, which caricatures both ‘blacks’ and ‘Indians’ as backward and
degenerate (albeit with differences between the two). Structural or institutional racism
helps to account for pervasive social inequalities between people who might be
construed as belonging to different ethnic groups in terms of access to health, employment,
education and representation in politics (e.g. see Callirgos 1993; Portocarrero, 1993).
Racism in Peru is also characterised by its hidden presence, masked behind other
narratives about difference, such as about ‘culture’ and ‘education’ – so-called ‘silent’
racism, to use de la Cadena’s term (2001).
Villagers in Yapatera are reluctant to talk about racist discrimination; many deny
having experienced it and most say that stereotypes about blacks do not apply to them
since they are mixed, not black. Nevertheless, this does not prevent others, especially
strangers, from casting many villagers in negative terms as ‘black’ or ‘brown’, especially
when they travel to other locations such as the nearby market town, the state capital
and Lima.
Without looking all the way to European and North American models of race,
therefore, villagers are confronted with an alternative construction which differs quite
starkly from their own local theory of race as a mixed and composite substance. The
existence of such alternative construction raises the question of whether villagers are
at all inﬂuenced by it in their thinking.
Expe r imen t a l me thods and r ac i a l e s sen t i a l i sm
Conversations about race are, by nature, difﬁcult conversations to have. In Yapatera,
villagers are aware of the negative stereotypes surrounding ‘blacks’, ‘Indians’ and other
‘non-whites’. They are keen to position themselves at a distance from such labels.
Indeed, it was because I wanted to observe whether and how notions of race, blackness,
Indian-ness and so on were used that I waited about nine months into my ﬁeldwork
before I initiated and engaged people in explicit conversations about race. Conducting
16months of ethnographic ﬁeldwork allowed me to document the hierarchies of
importance given to different types of categorisation and to different social markers. This
is a distinct advantage of ethnography over other forms of qualitative and quantitative
enquiry which must structure their questions to a much greater extent around pre-
conceived categories. But the question remains whether what villagers say about race
accurately and exhaustively reﬂects how they reason about it. For example, would
villagers reason any differently about race if the people in question were not themselves,
their families or their village, in other words, if the stakes were not so high?
To explore this question, I decided to use an experimental study adopted from the
literature on psychological essentialism. As discussed in the other two research articles
in this Special Issue, psychological essentialism refers to a cognitive bias which
predisposes people to assume that
certain categories (e.g. women, racial groups, dinosaurs etc.) have an underlying
reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly. Furthermore, this
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underlying reality (or ‘essence’) is thought to give objects their identity, and to be
responsible for similarities that category members share. (Gelman 2004: 404)
One consequence of this assumption is that essentialised categories have ‘inductive
potential’, namely, that one is prepared to generalise the knowledge one has
acquired about the members of a category (e.g. that tigers are ﬁerce) to novel instances
(e.g. this new tiger specimen is ﬁerce). As Gelman notes, inductive potential is ‘one of
the most important functions of categories. Categories serve not only to organize the
knowledge we have already acquired but also to guide our expectations’ (2004: 404).
The more a category is essentialised, the greater inductive potential it has (see
Gelman 2003: 26–59).
The ethnographic evidence I have presented about the way villagers in Yapatera
use racial terms suggests that they do not use ‘race’ as a basis for induction – hence, that
for them ‘race’ is not an essentialised category. Thus, knowing that someone is ‘black’,
‘cholo’ or ‘white’ is no basis for predicting or explaining a person’s customs, beliefs and
behaviours. This is evident when villagers refuse to speak about ‘blacks’, cholos or
‘whites’ in general terms as if members of each category shared common traits, and
when villagers resort to other social categories to explain a collective property,
behaviour or belief, as in the example of elopement mentioned above. And yet,
competing constructions of ‘race’ are also present: what activists and racists have in
common is that they essentialise ‘race’, using its inductive potential to either extol the
shared properties of the ‘blacks’ or to denigrate them.
In light of this, the question I wanted to investigate was whether, confronted with
an experimental task – that is, with a task that, to use Astuti’s expression, ‘forces people
to put their thinking cap on and leave their cultural narratives behind’ (2001: 433) –
villagers would resort to using the inductive potential of ‘race’ despite the fact that they
do not seem to do so in their everyday conversations. A reason to expect that they
might is that, apart from being exposed to the essentialisation of ‘race’ by other social
actors they interact with, the villagers themselves might have a cognitive bias towards
essentialism, which they might be predisposed to deploy when reasoning about social
categories such as ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ (as suggested, among others, by Hirschfeld
1996; Gil-White 2001a).4
4 There has been a cross-disciplinary call for a more cognitive approach to the study of ethnicity, race
and nationalism (Astuti forthcoming), particularly in cognitive and evolutionary anthropology
(Boyer 2006; Gil-White 2001a, 2001b; Hirschfeld 1996; Richerson and Boyd 2005) and cultural
anthropology (Levine 1999). As Brubaker et al. (2004) argue, the social and cognitive construction
of ethnicity (and race and nation) are not contradictory but are necessarily mutually constitutive: as
shared ways of understanding, interpreting and framing experience, constructions of ethnicity
require cognitive processes and mechanisms found in individual minds. In Brazil, cognitive
approaches have been used to investigate the claim that, despite local ideas about race positing
continuous, rather than categorical racial variation, ordinary people operate with basic conceptual
prototypical categories for classifying racial diversity into quite clear-cut basic categories of black,
white and Indian. Experimental methods have been used both to counter (Baran 2007; Baran and
Sousa 2001) and conﬁrm (Gil-White 2001b) the notion that Brazilian concepts of race are binary.
Jones (2009) directly investigates the issue of racial essentialism in Brazil, ﬁnding a local theory of
racial essences, but also that such essences can be mixed in individuals and that race does not create
clear-cut groups. Outside of North America and Brazil, however, few similar studies exist (for one
exception see Astuti et al. 2004).
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S tudy 1 : de s i g n and r e su l t s
Study 1 was designed to investigate the inductive potential of race as compared to other
social categories. The task is modelled on a study by Diesendruck and HaLevi (2006)
designed to investigate a different, but related, question in a different cultural context.
Diesendruck and HaLevi’s study was designed to show whether social category
membership is a more powerful source of induction than personality trait for adults
and children in Israel. Once adapted to the local circumstances, Diesendruck and
HaLevi’s task offered a template for establishing the inductive potential of race versus
social categories in Yapatera. Study 1 asked participants to make an inference and gave
them the choice of doing so on the basis of racial or other social characteristics. In a
series of trials, participants were asked whether a ﬁctitious character5 followed the same
customary practices as a person who was racially similar (and socially dissimilar), or a
person who was socially similar (and racially dissimilar).
The task was conducted after 15months of continuous ﬁeldwork and I chose to
test race against social categories which had emerged as especially culturally salient:
class (rich vs poor), religion (Catholic vs Evangelical), origin (from the state of Piura
vs from Lima) and kinship (cousins vs acquaintances). I also used salient local racial
terms against which to test social categories. The cultural practices or customs were
all ﬁctitious, novel, previously unknown properties since I was not interested in testing
participants’ knowledge of real customs, but rather whether they would use race or a
social category to make their inference. The made-up customs included culinary
preferences, forms of dress and rituals or cultural practices.
Twenty-four individuals ranging from 9 to 78years of age participated in the
study.6 Each participant took part in eight trials. While I read the script for each trial,
I presented participants with props in the form of paper cards with the relevant traits
written on them, to aid their memory. These were arranged on a table between the
participant and myself. For the sake of illustration for the reader, I include diagrams
here to give a better sense of how the task was conducted (Figure 1).
To give an example, the trial was formulated as follows:
Here are two men. This one here (pointing to A) is black. He is rich. He likes to
eat a food called poki. This man here (pointing to B) is white. He is poor. He
likes to eat a food called batso. Here now is a third man (pointing to target).
He is black like him (pointing to A) and poor like him (pointing to B). In your
opinion this third man, does he like to eat poki like him (pointing to A) or batso
like him (pointing to B)?
5 In these tasks the ﬁctitious characters were all male. Given discussions in the regional literature
which show that men and women are constructed racially in differing ways in Latin America, future
tests using ﬁctitious characters which are female could conceivably produce slightly different
results. For Brazil, speciﬁcally Rio de Janeiro, Goldstein (1999) has argued that mulata and mulato
(female and male mixed-race persons) are not equivalent in meaning; for Cuzco, Peru, de la Cadena
(1995) shows how women are constructed as ‘more Indian’ than men.
6 Although I tested participants individually and privately, several children, when they caught a
glimpse of what I was doing, begged to participate in the tasks. They were given randomised trials
and tested in the same way as adults. Because all their results were consistent with those of the adults
and their verbal explanations for their choices were similar to those given by adults, I include the
results obtained from tasks conducted with children. I did not test any children younger than nine.
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Participants’ responses were scored as ‘1’ if they judged that the target character
had the same property as the racial trait match and ‘0’ if they judged that the target
character had the same property as the social category match. The order and
combination of race and social traits was randomised across the participants. I
conducted eight trials per participant, giving a total of 192 trials and 192 possible
responses: either race or social category.
The results were as follows: participants used race as a basis for their inference
56 times (29%), while they used one of the other social categories 136 times (71%)
(Figure 2). A binomial test conﬁrmed that participants used one of the social categories
as a basis for their inference more often than expected by chance.7 In other words, class,
religion, locality and kinship were deemed to be more informative about the
characteristics of an individual than his race.8
By showing the weak inductive potential of race, the results of Study 1 are thus
consistent with the folk theory of race: individuals are the result of mixing, which
means that they cannot be categorised by their ‘racial’ attributes and that their
properties (customs, food preferences etc.) cannot be predicted by the colour of their
skin, the texture of their hair or the shape of their nose.
A possible objection to the task – by those who would expect race always to be
essentialised and to have inductive potential – is that it forced participants to engage
7 These results are signiﬁcant because the p-value = 0.00000067 (<0.01, for a 1% signiﬁcance level).
8 The data set was too small to provide statistically signiﬁcant results on the relative inductive
strength of the different social categories compared to each other. Preliminary results indicate that
class, origin, religion and kinship are not equally ranked against race across the sample and that class
is inductively richest relative to race (compared to origin, religion and kinship). The sample size was
also too small to provide results on the relative inductive strength of the different racial categories in
relation to each other or the inﬂuence of the ﬁctitious custom being asked about (i.e. food, ritual,
dress, other practice) on the choices given.
Figure 1 Sample formulation of Study 1
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in such a foreign exercise that the results, albeit in line with the ethnographic data,
might be the outcome of sheer misunderstanding or other task-related limitations. To
counter this possible objection, I designed a control task, in which I invited participants
to draw the same kind of inferences as in Study 1, but this time they had to choose to
base their reasoning on either race or on a number of socially non-meaningful
characteristics.
S tudy 2 : de s i g n and r e su l t s
The local folk theory of race suggests that a person’s racial traits have as little relevance
as other superﬁcial characteristics, such as her height. For this reason, I wanted to test
race’s inductive potential as compared to a number of random individual properties. I
therefore used a new task, which followed the design of Study 1 but which pitted race
against a number of socially insigniﬁcant characteristics: having a scar on one side of
the face versus the other, different shoe sizes, different birth dates, a wound on one
leg versus the other. Would participants be as likely to use these random characteristics
as the basis for their inference as they would use race?
As in Study 1, cards were used as visual props. A sample trial in Study 2 read as
follows:
Here are two men. This one here (pointing to A) is black. He has a scar on his left
cheek. He likes to eat a food called poki. This man here (pointing to B) is white.
He has a scar on his right cheek. He likes to eat a food called batso. Here now
is a third man (pointing to target). He is black like him (pointing to A) and has
a scar on his right cheek like him (pointing to B). In your opinion this
third man, does he like to eat poki like him (pointing to A) or batso like him
(pointing to B)?
Figure 2 Results of Study 1: race versus social category
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As in Study 1, I scored race responses as ‘1’ and superﬁcial responses as ‘0’. The
order and combination of race and social traits was randomised across the participants.
In this second task I had 16 participants, ranging between the ages of 9 and 82. Each
participant completed eight trials, giving a total of 128 trials.
The results were as follows: participants used race 103 times (80%), while they
used one of the random characteristics 15 times (20%). The binomial test conﬁrmed
the statistical signiﬁcance of the result,9 i.e. participants made inferences based on race
more often than expected by chance.
The results of this second task are signiﬁcant not so much for what they say on
their own, but for how they relate to Study 1 (Figure 3). Speciﬁcally, when combined,
the results suggest that race is inferentially richer than superﬁcial characteristics, but
less so than meaningful social categories. We would do well to see essentialism,
speciﬁcally inductive potential, on a graded spectrum with low inductive potential at
one end and high inductive potential on the other. In Yapatera, race sits well on the
lower end of the spectrum, but not quite on the extreme low end as villagers would
have it. Arguably, this ﬁnding echoes with aspects of the ethnographic data: after all,
a folk theory that stresses mixing does not preclude the ontological primacy of separate
pure, races.
However, the overall point remains that villagers in Yapatera have a non-essentialist
construal of race. In this respect, the implications of the results of Study 2 for Study 1 are
of special importance: they suggest that participants in Study 1 purposefully avoided
using race as a basis for their reasoning, and chose instead social categories such as class,
origin, religion and kinship; Study 2 proves that they did so not because of problems in
the task design, but because they deem race to be inferentially weaker than those other
social categories.
9 The results are signiﬁcant because the p-value = 0.0000000000000229 (<0.01, for a 1% signiﬁcance
level).
Figure 3 Results of Study 2: race versus superﬁcial category
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Expe r imen t s as a d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f conve r s a t i o n
The experimental data from the two studies largely supported the ethnographic
ﬁndings, suggesting that villagers’ folk theory of race is not just a way of talking, but
that it informs their way of reasoning about novel scenarios. In addition to conﬁrming
the ethnographic data, conducting the tasks allowed me to have a different kind of
conversation with my informants. The physical and social setting within which these
tasks were conducted made this clear to them. Most of my ethnographic data-gathering
happened in a number of very different settings: sitting on the vereda chatting, usually
with multiple people and always within earshot of passers-by outside and kin inside the
house; it also happened while riding on donkey carts, sorting mangos, treading through
rice ﬁelds, shufﬂing behind cofﬁns at funerals, before and after church, at public or
social gatherings, watching TV, resting from work, cooking and while walking
alongside each other. The experimental tasks required and created a different
environment: participants were taken into a quiet room indoors (usually a living room)
on their own, and sat at a table (usually a dining table that is rarely used) facing me
across the table. Participants also signalled to me that they saw this as a different
context for conversation. For example, when I ﬁrst started explaining the task, many
expressed concerns about ‘getting the answers right’, and expressed a desire not to
disappoint me, something no one ever worried about when I interacted with them
via traditional ‘participant observation’. As part of the task set-up, I reassured
participants that there were no right or wrong answers and that instead I was interested
in their opinion about a given subject and that I was hoping to hear the many different
views that might exist in the village. None of my participants refused or had difﬁculties
answering the test questions, although most paused to carefully consider their answers;
instead, they quickly seized on what was undoubtedly a very different activity for
them, and many took obvious delight in what often became a sort of game or puzzle.
Most importantly, engaging people in these hypothetical scenarios offered me an
opportunity to ask my informants to draw comparisons between race and social
categories in a way that normal language and conversation did not allow – both because
of the abstractness and the thorniness of such a comparison. I also learnt a great deal
from the explanations that participants gave for their answers (after each trial and after
recording the response, I asked participants for an explanation of their judgements,
giving them an opportunity to respond more freely to the task).10 Their answers made
explicit things which could not otherwise be articulated. For example, in the cases
where participants chose one of the social categories over race, they often verbally
stressed the social or cultural similarity between two individuals who differed ‘racially’,
often going out of their way to deny that race was meaningful. For example, one
participant told me, ‘A black and a white are of different races but it doesn’t
matter. In Lima there are blacks and whites. And there are some whites who like
ceviche [a ﬁsh dish] and other whites who don’t like ceviche’. While this explanation
conﬁrms the ethnographic data (i.e. that things like food preferences and other customs
do not follow racial lines and that race cannot therefore be used to categorise people in
a socially meaningful way), it could not have been articulated in a normal conversation
because villagers rarely talk about ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ in such an explicit way.
10 Unlike in an ordinary dialogue I merely recorded their responses, without responding to their
explanations or asking follow-up questions.
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Perhaps most intriguing are the explanations given for the minority of cases when,
in Study 1, participants based their inferences on race: how could they justify their
choice, given the powerful cultural narratives on mixing and the social irrelevance of
race? In these few instances, participants were quite imaginative in drawing attention
to, inventing or invoking circumstantial social, environmental or cultural factors that
would explain why the two characters in the story shared the same characteristic.
For example, participants stated that the racially similar characters shared a house, came
from the same village, were friends or were work colleagues. In other cases, participants
made up quite elaborate stories about the target character who was said to emulate the
customs of the racially similar test character, in order to overcome a status disadvantage
he shared with the other racially dissimilar but socially similar test character.
Conc l u s i o n
The results of the experimental studies conﬁrm the ethnographic account of the folk
theory of race that villagers in Yapatera articulate in their everyday lives and
interactions. Despite their exposure to essentialist constructions of race, villagers used
their non-essentialist folk theory to inform their reasoning in the tasks.
This is new empirical evidence on ordinary Latin Americans’ ideas about race,
which demonstrates the importance of mixture and its non-essentialist consequences.
Latin Americanists have shown that narratives of mixture, such as in political
ideologies of mestizaje, have discursive and rhetorical power for ideas about nation
building, for ideas about exclusion and inclusion at the level of the imagined nation.
However, the data presented here suggest that, at least in Yapatera, ordinary people’s
ideas about mixture, which emerge from their own experience of history, of the
economy and kinship, inform the way they reason inferentially. In other words,
mixture is not just a way of talking; it is also a way of thinking.
The extent to which these local ideas about mixture are related to broader, Pan
Latin-American, nation-building narratives of mestizaje, is up for debate. In Peru
and other parts of the Andes, mestizaje was not embraced as a dominant unifying
theme of cultural nationalism nor did it become ofﬁcial state policy; instead, elites
and intellectuals largely rejected racial mixture as a form of degeneration (Chambers
2003: 48; Larson 2004: 66). On the other hand, ideas about mixture at a national level
inform the notion of ‘Peruvianness’ as more or less racially ‘mixed’ (as evidenced, for
example, by the absence of a question about race on the national census). In Peru, ideas
about mestizaje are articulated only when they are challenged, for example by ethnic
activism. It is thus fair to conclude that villagers in Yapatera have, to a large extent,
come up with their own ideas about mixture and the irrelevance of race, and that they
have done so through their own engagement with, and participation in, historical and
economic processes and kinship practices.
Indeed, villagers’ non-essentialist construal of race might be explained with
reference to their location at the bottom of Peruvian social hierarchy. As the
descendants of both Africans and Indians, both of whom have, in different ways, been
excluded from the projects of nationhood, modernity, civilisation and culture, there is
much at stake in arguing, as they do, that race is irrelevant for social categorisation. A
similar argument has been made by Mahalingam (2003), who compares conceptions of
caste between Dalits and Brahmins in India, and ﬁnds that people at the bottom of the
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social hierarchy might be more prone to thinking about caste in non-essentialist terms,
while those at the top might be more prone to essentialise caste. Similarly, mestizaje
may look very different from below than from above. For people in Yapatera, mixture
works against a system of racial categorisation which would potentially cast them in a
negative light. But it is likely that for people at the top of the social hierarchy, for
example white Peruvian elites of European descent, mixture serves different purposes
and holds different political meanings.
What is sure is that in Yapatera mixture, with its non-, even anti-essentialist
potential, is fully embraced and deployed to talk and to reason about the social world.
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